




Working Paper No. 2012-02 
 
 
The Overpricing Problem: Moral 




University of Alberta 
 
Troy Hannweber 
University of Alberta 
 
Henry van Egteren 





Copyright to papers in this working paper series rests with the authors and their assignees.  
Papers may be downloaded for personal use.  Downloading of papers for any other activity 
may not be done without the written consent of the authors. 
 
Short excerpts of these working papers may be quoted without explicit permission provided 
that full credit is given to the source. 
 
The Department of Economics, The Institute for Public Economics, and the University of 
Alberta accept no responsibility for the accuracy or point of view represented in this work in 
progress. The Overpricing Problem: Moral Hazard and
Franchises





We hypothesize that moral hazard is an important factor in explaining
the under performance of ﬁrms, identiﬁed by Ritter (1991), following initial
public oﬀerings (IPOs). We test this hypothesis by comparing post-IPO
returns of franchised and non-franchised ﬁrms. Franchised IPOs, whose
franchise agreements mitigate the moral hazard problems that arise from
the dilution of ownership following an IPO, outperform their non-franchised,
matched counterpart IPOs over ﬁve years in the aftermarket.
Keywords: IPO, Moral Hazard, Overpricing, Franchises
JEL Codes: G02, G141. Introduction
The empirical ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed two interesting characteristics asso-
ciated with the returns to ﬁr m si n v o l v e di na ni n i t i a lp u b l i co ﬀering (IPO). The
ﬁrst characteristic is the tendency for almost all stock prices to rise above their
oﬀer prices once market trading begins. This is referred to as the underpric-
ing problem. The second characteristic, referred to as the overpricing problem,
identiﬁed that, when average IPO stock returns were compared to the average
returns for a similar, matched, group of non-IPO ﬁrms in the three to ﬁve year af-
ter market, the IPO ﬁrms sustained systematically lower average returns (Ritter,
1991).
Broadly speaking, theories that attempt to explain these two characteristics
fall into two categories, those based on the belief that markets can exhibit ineﬃ-
ciencies and those that believe markets are inherently eﬃcient. The ﬁrst category
contains models dealing with bounded rationality (to be discussed in detail below)
in which agents are optimizing but are cognitively constrained in some fashion so
the overpricing and underpricing phenomena emerge as endogenous outcomes but
require some sort of limited processing power on the part of agents. The second
category is highlighted by the argument in Eckbo and Norli (2005)i nw h i c hI P O
and non-IPO ﬁrms have systematically diﬀerent levels of risk suggesting an eﬃ-
cient market would naturally associate lower returns with lower risk. That is,
IPOs have lower returns because they also have lower risk and thus, the diﬀer-
ence in returns is a natural consequence of eﬃcient market behaviour. Eckbo and
2Norli (2005)o ﬀer compelling evidence in support of an eﬃcient markets hypoth-
esis as well as refutation of the need to use bounded rationality models as a way
to explain the overpricing phenomenon. Nonetheless, we believe their evidence
is incomplete because of the role played by moral hazard when ﬁr m si n i t i a t ea n
IPO is not addressed directly.1
Based on Jensen and Meckling (1976), the moral hazard explanation contained
in the literature posits that the IPO moves ownership away from the individuals
who operate and manage a ﬁrm, thereby diluting the owner-manager relationship
and creating a moral hazard problem. Subsequent higher agency costs cause
returns to be lower. If moral hazard matters and returns are lower because of
this, everything else equal, then the debate over the eﬃcient markets hypothesis is
still open since the existence of moral hazard resulting from an IPO should signal
to investors that returns will be lower and therefore the IPO stock should not
be purchased. Since the IPO stocks are purchased, this suggests that bounded
rationality models could be used to explain this choice. The problem of course is
everything is not equal when the IPO occurs; risk factors are diﬀerent across IPO
and non-IPO ﬁrms and we need to identify the role of moral hazard for a given
set of risk factors. This type of moral hazard issue is not addressed in Eckbo and
Norli (2005) so we do not know if risk factors or moral hazard are more important
in explaining returns.
In this paper, we argue that an IPO actually involves a double moral hazard
1We do not mean to suggest that Eckbo and Norli (2005) claim to have provided a complete
explanation.
3problem. As ownership and management are separated, the actions of manage-
ment become hidden from ownership and the actions of ownership become hidden
from managers. If this is true, then organizational forms that mitigate both types
of moral hazard should perform better. We argue that franchised ﬁrms display
systematically lower levels of moral hazard than non-franchised ﬁrms since, in
addition to oﬀering a franchisee an ownership stake in the ﬁrm, a franchise agree-
ment speciﬁes the rights and obligations of the franchisor, such as advertising
support and training.2 In fact, the agreement acts as a third party enforceable
commitment device tying ownership to speciﬁc actions regardless of the form of
ownership. Thus, even though a franchised ﬁrm involved in an IPO will suﬀer
from the ﬁrst type of moral hazard in the same manner as a non-franchised ﬁrm
undergoing an IPO, such is not the case for the second type of moral hazard.
Thus, post-IPO moral hazard is mitigated more eﬀectively in the franchised ﬁrm
than in a non-franchised ﬁrm since post-IPO ownership is held accountable for
value-enhancing activities. If moral hazard explains patterns in post-IPO returns,
then franchise ﬁrms should out-perform comparable, non-franchise ﬁrms.3
We test this hypothesis by comparing the weighted average returns from fran-
c h i s e da n dn o n - f r a n c h i s e dI P O sf o ras a m p l eo fA m e r i c a nI P O sb e t w e e n1981 and
2010. By considering only ﬁrms that have undergone an IPO, the risk factors
identiﬁed by Eckbo and Norli (2005) as a key factor in explaining returns across
2Most franchise agreements specify the rights and obligations of the franchisee, specifying
such things as territories; the duration of the franchise agreement; and, payments to be made
by the two parties (Rubin, 1978).
3See Lafointaine, 1992; Brickley and Dark, 1987;a n dN o r t o n ,1988
4IPO and non-IPO ﬁr m sa r et h es a m ef o ro u re n t i r es a m p l eo fﬁrms, franchise and
non-franchise alike. Figure 1 shows the equally weighted raw returns from using a
buy and hold strategy from our sample of 81 franchised IPO ﬁr m sa n das a m p l eo f
non-franchised IPO ﬁrms matched by the IPO date and market size. Although the
initial returns for the non-franchised companies is slightly higher than the group
of franchises, before the ﬁrst year post-IPO, the returns to franchised ﬁrms rise
signiﬁcantly above those of the non-franchised ﬁrms, where they remain for the
full ﬁve years post-IPO. As ﬁgure 1 suggests, we ﬁnd evidence that the franchised
group of ﬁrms sustains higher average returns than the matched, non-franchised
group of ﬁrms. This diﬀerence in average returns supports the hypothesis that
moral hazard is an important factor in explaining the performance of IPO ﬁrms
in the three to ﬁve year aftermarket. Indeed, our regression results suggest that
the franchise status of a ﬁrm has a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on ﬁrm returns.
The importance of moral hazard in this sample, which holds constant the risk
factors in Eckbo and Norli (2005), suggests that moral hazard could be important
in explaining returns across IPO and non-IPO ﬁrms since only one group has
sustained an increase in moral hazard resulting from an IPO.4 Thus, our results
provide strong indirect evidence that moral hazard matters in an explanation of
4
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers deviate from the goal of share-
holder wealth-maximization by consuming perquisities when they do not have own-
ership stake in the ﬁrm (Yang and Sheu,2006,p g . 61).
5the overpricing problem. In addition, our evidence suggests that the debate over
the eﬃcient markets hypothesis should remain open.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,w ep r e s e n ta
review of the overpricing literature. Section 3 contains a discussion of our data and
methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical ﬁndings and section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Literature Review
The overpricing problem was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Ritter (1991) who found that, in
the three to ﬁve year aftermarket, average returns to IPO ﬁrms appear lower than
a control group, suggesting IPO ﬁrms consistently under perform when compared
to the market in the three to ﬁve year aftermarket.5 This phenomenon is not
conﬁn e dt oU SI P O s .K o o l ia n dS u r e t( 2004) ﬁnd in the Canadian market, ﬁrms
undertaking IPOs between 1991 and 1998 generate returns that under perform
in the aftermarket. Lee et al. (1996) ﬁnd evidence in Australia of signiﬁcant
negative aftermarket performance of returns for ﬁr m si n v o l v e di na nI P Ow h i l e
Aggarwal et al.( 1993) ,C a ia n dW e i( 1997), and Keloharju (1993) ﬁnd similar
patterns in Brazil, Japan, and Finland, respectively.
Theoretical support for these ﬁndings is contained in models of bounded ra-
tionality. For example, Hong and Stein (1999) suppose agents vary according
to their capacity to process publicly provided information and by systematically
5Loughran and Ritter (1995)a l s oﬁnd evidence of underperformance in the US market.
6limiting this processing power are able to derive both the underpricing and over-
pricing phenomena as endogenous outcomes. On the other hand, Ljungqvist et
al. (2006) produce the two phenomena as endogenous outcomes by assuming a
constant supply of "irrationally exuberant" agents for every IPO. Notice that this
assumes that either agents never ﬁg u r eo u tt h a tt h e ya r ei rrationally exuberant,
o rt h a tn e wa g e n t so ft h i st y p ec o n t i n u et oe n t e rt h em a r k e t .
In response to these behavioural asset pricing models, Brav and Gompers
(1997) provide empirical support for a diﬀerence in returns that does not require
bounded rationality. They identify a similar pattern of post-issue returns in small
growth and high growth stocks. With IPOs tending to be small growth stocks,
the pattern of returns can be explained as a fundamental diﬀerence between small
a n dh i g hg r o w t hs t o c k sr a t h e rt h a nI P Oa n dn o n - I P Oﬁrms. Eckbo and Norli
(2005) attempt to identify the hidden risk factors implicit in the ﬁndings for Brav
and Gompers (1997). They argue that both liquidity risk and leverage are lower
for IPOs implying that returns would naturally be lower for IPO ﬁrms.6
Empirical tests of the moral hazard hypothesis in explaining the overpricing
problem have focused on whether the degree of insider ownership or managerial
ownership aﬀects the values, returns, or survivability of an IPO ﬁrm.7 Jain and
Kini (1994) ﬁnd that IPO ﬁrms where owners retain higher ownership generally
6Spinelli et al. (2003) argue that franchised IPO ﬁrms outperform a group of matched, non-
IPO ﬁrms that display similar average risk levels. However, their results do not hold for the ﬁnal
two years of their study. Nonetheless, these results are consistent with the indirect evidence
provided by our study.
7The extistence of moral hazard also can explain the underpricing problem if investors do
not fully understand the moral hazard problem and purchase the stock based on pre-IPO infor-
mation.
7perform better in the aftermarket relative to other issuing ﬁrms.8 In a study of the
Netherlands’ market, Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005) ﬁnd that management
stock ownership, the proportion of independent directors and board monitoring by
large non-management shareholders, reduce agency costs and increase IPO ﬁrm
value while super-majority management stock ownership and takeover defence,
increase agency costs and in turn have a negative eﬀect on value. Their ﬁndings
do not resolve the issue of the aftermarket performance of IPOs. Finally, Yang
a n dS h e u( 2006) ﬁnd that survivability of Taiwanese IPO ﬁrms ﬁrst decreases and
then increases as insider ownership is increased.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
Our data set covers 81 publicly traded companies that went public between 1981
and 2005, franchised prior to their IPO, and for which the franchising was not
simply a small component of a larger publicly traded company.9 Our list of fran-
chised companies was compiled using Franchise Annual Handbooks, 1981 through
2006, and included ﬁrms that are traded on, or have previously traded on, one or
8Jain and Kini (1994) however, cannot determine whether the superior performance is due
to the lower agency costs due to higher ownership retention, as a result of owners signalling high
quality with ownership retention, or for other reasons.
9The sample begins in 1981 because we could ﬁnd no publicly traded franchising companies
with earlier issue dates that satisﬁed our franchise criteria and could be matched to another
company.
8more of the NYSE, AMEX, or the NASDAQ exchange.
Time Period Number of IPOs Total Market Value ($ million, 2005)
1981 − 1985 16 148125
1986 − 1990 13 85483
1996 − 2000 24 360703
2001 − 2005 16 490753
2006 − 2010 12 709835
Total 81 1794899
Table1: Time Series Distribution of Franchised IPOs
Table 1 outlines the distribution of the number of franchising IPOs and the gross
proceeds for each 5 year period. Almost 65% of the IPOs took place after 1990
and these IPOs represent 86% of the total market value.
Market Value ( $)N u m b e r o f I P O sT o t a l  ($, 2005)
 100 39 206040
100 500 32 675750
500 1 7 457421
1 3 455689
Total 81 1794899
Table 2: Distribution of Franchised IPOs by Size
 = millions;  = billions
9In fact, while only 15% of franchised ﬁrms had an IPO after 2000, these ﬁrms
represent 40% of total market value. Table 2 presents the distribution of the
number of franchising IPOs and the gross proceeds by size. Small IPOs ( 
$1 0 0million) represent 48% of our sample but only 11% of the total sample
value, while large IPOs ( $5 0 0million) make up 12% of our sample but
represent 51% of the total value of our sample.
3.2. Methodology
We examine abnormal returns for franchised companies using the control ﬁrm
approach.10 Our control ﬁrms are non-franchised companies with an IPO date
within 3 months before or after the franchise company’s IPO, a market capitaliza-
tion between 70 and 130 percent of the issuing ﬁrm and are traded on the NYSE,
AMEX or NASDAQ.11 We examine returns for the 60 month period following the
IPO date, where a month is deﬁned as 21 consecutive trading days. The long run
returns for all ﬁrms were calculated from daily returns in CRSP. If a ﬁrm delists
before the end of the aftermarket period, the sample is truncated. As such, the
number of ﬁrms being compared falls over the 60 month time series.
We measure performance using buy and hold abnormal returns (), de-
ﬁned as
10Studies that use the control ﬁrm approach include, Kooli and Suret (2004), Barber and
Lyon (1997), and Barber et al. (1999).
11We do not match on the basis of book-to-market value because of the lack of book value
data for a number of the franchising IPOs. We chose not to match the ﬁrms by industry because












(1 + ) − 1
#
 (3.1)
where  is the time period,  is the return of the franchised ﬁrm  in period
,  is the return of the non-franchised (control) ﬁrm  in period .W e u s e
 rather than Cumulative Abnormal Returns ()a so u rm e t r i cf o rt w o
reasons. First, using the control ﬁrm approach rather than a reference portfolio
approach eliminates both the new listing and rebalancing biases and by matching
ﬁrms according to the date of their IPO, the skewness bias is expected to be
small. Second, testing for abnormal returns using  and  tests two
very distinct hypotheses. The hypothesis tested with  is the return from
buying and holding the franchised ﬁrm for 60 months is equal to that from buying
and holding the non-franchised ﬁrm. On the other hand, the hypothesis tested
with  is in each month, the returns from holding the two companies are
diﬀerent. For our purposes, the  hypothesis is of greater interest.12
4. Results
On an equally-weighted basis, the set of franchised IPOs depicted in ﬁgure 1 has a
marginally positive return of 03% after the ﬁr s tm o n t h ,w h i l et h en o n - f r a n c h i s e d
ﬁrms see a slightly higher return of 25%. The franchised IPOs experience con-
sistently increasing returns until 4 years post-IPO, at which point the return is
713%. The average return to the franchised IPOs falls over the last 12 months.
12See Lyon and Barber (1997) for a discussion.
11In contrast, the average returns to the control group begin to fall after 3 months
post-IPO, ﬂuctuating around 0 until 28 months and between 0 and 10% for the re-
mainder of the 5 year sample. At the end of the ﬁve year aftermarket period, while
the franchised IPOs experience an average return of 517%, the non-franchised
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R e t u r n Franchises
Control Group
Figure 1: Monthly Equally-Weighted Average Returns, Franchises and Control Group
In ﬁgure two, on a value-weighted basis, we see a larger diﬀerence between
the franchised ﬁrms and their matches, save the very end of the 60 month period.
The franchised group again has a marginally positive return of 05% after the ﬁrst
month, which increases to 458% at 24 months post-IPO. The average returns
then fall over the last 3 years, to 95% at the end of 5 years. The returns to the
control group are −32% after 1 month, and after a few months of growth, the
returns fall and remain negative until the last few months of the sample. The
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Franchising Companies
Control Group
Figure 2: Monthly Value-Weighted Average Returns, Franchises and Control Group
The test statistic used to test the null hypotheses that  =0at the end








where  is the sample average and () is the sample standard
deviation of abnormal returns for the sample of  ﬁrms. The statistic is based on
the the assumption of equal variances across the two groups, which could not be
rejected at a reasonable level of signiﬁcance by an  −  for equal variances.
Table 3 shows the  at the end of each post-IPO year and indicates
the level of signiﬁcance at which we can reject the null  =0 ; * denotes
13signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.






Table 3: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns, Control Group
Null hypothesis  =0
We reject the null hypotheses at all period lengths for the equally weighted 
with an abnormal return of 188% at 12 months, growing to 777% at 48 months,
and ending at 506% at the end of 5 years. However, we can only reject the null
hypotheses at 24 and 36 months for the value weighted .13 In this case,
the returns are 176% after 1 year, 647% and 503% after 2 and 3 years, but only
99% after 5 years.
4.1. Regression Analysis
In this section, we examine further the returns for franchising companies relative
to our control ﬁrms by estimating ﬁrm level returns at the end of each year as a
13The insigniﬁcance of the test statistics reﬂects, in part, the low power of the test. For
example, Figure 2 suggests that the weighted average returns for the two groups are quite
diﬀerent after 4 years. See Gur-Gershgoren et al. (2008) for a discussion.
14function of an indicator of whether it is a franchise and a number of covariates.
This allows us to identify the eﬀect of franchise status controlling for industry and
other possible covariates. As well, it might suggest diﬀerences in returns that the
weak  test misses. Our sample includes our franchising companies and our
control ﬁrms. We estimate the following equation for each  ∈ {24364860}:
ln = 0 + 1  + 2  + 3 (4.2)
+4 + 5    + 
where  =( 1+) is the return of the  ﬁrm in post-IPO period .14
 =1if the company is classiﬁed as a franchise and   is 0 real
market value at the IPO, in millions of $.  is a vector of dummy
variables that controls for the industry in which the company operates, speciﬁ-
cally , , , ,a n d, with manufacturing
excluded.  is a vector of dummy variables that identiﬁes the stock
exchange upon which the company’s stock was trading and includes NYSE and
NASDAQ, with AMEX being the control.   is the year in which ﬁrm 0 IPO
was performed, with 1981 being excluded.  indicates the number of months the
stock has been trading.  is a random disturbance term. Table 4 presents a
14We do not report our results for  =1 2because the model was not jointly signiﬁcant.
15summary of the regression results and robust standard errors for each .
 (months) 24 ( =1 5 9 ) 3 6(  = 152) 48 ( =1 4 4 ) 6 0(  =1 3 4 )
Franchise **049(019) **058(023) **045(018) **048(023)
Market Value −021(033) −051(044) ***−060(022) −057(057)
Transportation 032(046) *071(035) **064(030) 049(052)
Wholesale −040(037) −031(038) −033(043) −093(073)
Retail −004(024) 016(026) 015(022) 008(030)
Finance 023(023) 038(031) ***064(023) 060(028)
Service −024(025) −033(035) −022(026) −042(033)
NYSE 017(041) 054(048) 024(041) 045(056)
NASDAQ −039(033) −025(027) *−065(035) −058(049)
Year *−003(001) *−003(002) −002(001) *−003(002)
Constant *5281(2694) *6804(3470) 4640(2807) *6047(3587)
R-squared 01105 01619 02014 01735
T a b l e4 : O L SR e s u l t s( C o e ﬃcient; standard errors)
* denotes signiﬁc a n c ea t1 0 % ,* *a t5 %a n d* * *a t1 %
For all period lengths,  is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at
5% suggesting that franchises earn a higher post-IPO return, controlling for other
factors. Although most of the coeﬃcients on individual industry dummies are
not signiﬁcant, we can reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to
zero at 5% for  ∈ {4860} Likewise, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
16coeﬃcients on NYSE and NASDAQ are jointly equal to 0 at 10% for  =3 6and
at 1% for  ∈ {4860}. Finally, our results suggest returns fall as the IPO year
increases, although the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for  ∈ {2436}
5. Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to determine whether agency costs have an eﬀect
on the long run aftermarket performance of initial public oﬀerings. Theoretically,
franchising should mitigate the moral hazard problem that arises from the dilution
of ownership after issuing stock to the public. If our theory is correct, we should
be able to identify evidence from the IPOs of ﬁrms that engage in franchising
as their main form of business that should not suﬀer the same poor aftermarket
performance that has historically been noted to plague initial public oﬀerings of
stocks. In our study, we ﬁnd strong evidence that franchised ﬁrms undergoing an
IPO outperform the issues of ﬁrms that do not engage in franchising.
The key innovation in our paper was to ﬁnd a way to separate out the eﬀects
of moral hazard on returns from the eﬀects of diﬀerent risk factors on returns
identiﬁed in Eckbo and Norli (2005). We did this by examining only IPO ﬁrms
and then identifying a plausible variation in moral hazard across ﬁrms within this
group.
While the evidence seems to suggest that agency theory is a plausible contrib-
utor to the poor long run aftermarket performance of IPOs, we have not examined
whether other risk factors, not yet identiﬁed within the group of franchised IPO
17ﬁr m sv e r s u sn o n f r a n c h i s e dI P Oﬁrms can contribute to an explanation of the
diﬀerences in returns.
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